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MORE THAN A PIECE OF PAPER: SAME-SEX PARENTS AND 
THEIR ADOPTED CHILDREN ARE ENTITLED TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION IN THE REALM OF BIRTH CERTIFICATES 
SHOHREH DAVOODI*
INTRODUCTION
Both the proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage have kept 
the controversial topic in the United States spotlight for several years. The 
beam of that spotlight widened further after the Supreme Court decided 
both United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry in the 2012 term. 
While the inequalities experienced by gays and lesbians have begun to 
appear on the front page with increasing regularity, the public is paying less 
attention to the struggles of their children. 
The patchwork of laws regarding the status of same-sex relationships 
in the United States can be difficult to traverse for gay parents and their 
children.1 The number of gay and lesbian parents in the U.S. continues to 
increase, making the lack of uniformity in laws particularly problematic.2
In the United States, it is estimated that there are at least 125,000 same-sex 
couples raising nearly 220,000 children.3 Of those, more than 16,000 same-
sex couples are raising approximately 22,000 adopted children.4 In fact, 
same-sex couples with children are four times more likely to raise an 
adopted child than heterosexual couples with children.5
* The author would like to thank Professor Kathy Baker for suggesting this topic and supplying numer-
ous ideas and revisions throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank Jason 
Cairns for his unwavering love and support. 
 1.  See Lissette Gonzalez, Comment, “With Liberty and Justice for All [Families]”: The Modern 
American Same-Sex Family, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 293, 322 (2011) (“The law as it pertains to same-
sex parents is made up of complications, inconsistencies, and an inadequate body of legal rights. Alt-
hough today gay parentage remains at the forefront of the legal arena, there remains widespread unwill-
ingness among courts and legislatures to stray from traditional notions of parentage, as well as stern 
opposition to treating same-sex families with the same level of respect and equality as heterosexual or 
‘normal’ families”). 
 2.  Id.
 3.  Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, WILLIAMS INST. 1, 3 (Feb. 2013), avail-
able at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf.
 4.  Id.
 5.  Id.
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The absence of consistent adoption laws in the United States has re-
sulted in states making their own adoption determinations.6 Many states 
only allow adoptions by married couples or single unmarried persons, pre-
cluding unmarried couples from jointly adopting children.7 This is the cur-
rent state of adoption law in Louisiana.8
In 2006, Louisiana’s Registrar of Vital Records and Statistics (the 
Registrar) refused to reissue an accurate birth certificate for a Louisiana-
born child adopted by same-sex parents residing in New York.9 The adop-
tive parents wanted their child’s birth certificate to reflect both of their 
names. However, the Registrar insisted she could only include one of the 
parents’ names since they were not married and Louisiana law does not 
permit joint adoption of a child by unmarried parents.10 This led to Adar v. 
Smith, a case in which the Fifth Circuit upheld the Registrar’s birth certifi-
cate policy, and the court decided that both the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause claims brought by the adoptive parents 
failed.11
This Comment seeks to demonstrate how the Fifth Circuit incorrectly 
analyzed the adoptive parents’ equal protection claim and wrongly held 
that the Registrar’s policy was constitutional. By denying accurate birth 
certificates to out-of-state parents with legal parental status, Louisiana is 
unnecessarily revisiting valid parentage determinations for no justifiable 
reason. Louisiana has no legitimate interest in undermining the strength of 
out-of-state parent-child relationships, but refusing to issue birth certifi-
cates with the names of both adoptive parents does just that. Consequently, 
such a policy is constitutionally impermissible. 
Part I of this Comment will detail the Adar court’s decision and the 
circumstances that led up to its issuance. Part II will explain the importance 
of birth certificates and the potential consequences that could come to the 
adoptive children of same-sex parents who cannot obtain an accurate birth 
certificate that includes the names of both parents. Finally, Part III will 
 6.  Katherine A. West, Comment, Denying a Class of Adopted Children Equal Protection, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 963, 968 (2013). However, there is a Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) drafted by 
the Uniform Law Commission. The UAA lays out a set of proposed adoption laws, and many states 
have modeled their adoption laws based on them. Adoption Act (1994) Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20(1994) (last visited Jan. 22, 
2015). 
 7.  West, supra note 6, at 968. 
 8.  LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (1991). 
 9.  Adar v. Smith (Adar II), 639 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 
(2011). 
 10.  Id.
 11.  Id. at 150. 
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explore two different ways that the Registrar’s policy could be unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause: (1) the policy may burden a fun-
damental right stemming from family autonomy, or (2) it may discriminate 
against out-of-state same-sex parents. 
I. ADAR V. SMITH — LOUISIANA’S REGISTRAR REFUSES TO ISSUE A
BIRTH CERTIFICATE WITH THE NAMES OF BOTH SAME-SEX ADOPTIVE
PARENTS OF A LOUISIANA-BORN CHILD
Infant J was born in Shreveport, Louisiana in 2005.12 In April 2006, 
Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith, a same-sex couple residing in Connect-
icut, obtained an adoption decree for Infant J through a New York family 
court.13 The adoptive parents sought to have Infant J’s birth certificate 
amended in Louisiana, substituting their names for those of the biological 
parents.14 As advised by the State’s Attorney General, the Registrar refused 
to honor their request and update the certificate.15 The Registrar cited a 
Louisiana statute that said new records of birth could be issued to “adoptive 
parents,” which the Registrar took to mean married parents.16 She inter-
preted the statute this way because Louisiana law dictates that only married 
couples can jointly adopt a child.17 The Registrar did, however, offer to put 
one of the parents’ names on the birth certificate because Louisiana allows 
single-parent adoptions.18
Mickey and Oren sued the Registrar in federal court. They alleged that 
the Registrar’s refusal to issue Infant J a new birth certificate violated both 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution.19 The district court found for the adoptive par-
ents under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.20 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that Louisiana law required 
the Registrar to reissue the birth certificate.21
 12.  Adar v. Smith (Adar I), 597 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, Adar v. Smith 
(Adar II), 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 13.  Id.
 14.  Adar II, 639 F.3d at 149. 
 15.  Adar I, 597 F.3d at 701. 
 16.  Id. at 701–02; Adar II, 639 F.3d at 149–50; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(a), (c) (2012) 
(“When a person born in Louisiana is adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction . . . the state registrar 
may create a new record of birth” and “the state registrar shall make a new record in its archives, show-
ing . . . [t]he names of the adoptive parents.”). 
 17.  Adar I, 597 F.3d at 701–02. 
 18.  Adar II, 639 F.3d at 150. 
 19.  Id. at 151. 
 20.  Id. at 150. 
 21.  Id.
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However, the Fifth Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc and 
vacated their previous decision.22 In the court’s new decision, it reasoned 
that amending Infant J’s birth certificate would not constitute recognition 
of the adoption, but enforcement of it, and held that Mickey and Oren’s 
valid New York adoption did not have to be “enforced” by the Registrar.23
Put differently, while the Registrar claimed to acknowledge Mickey and 
Oren as Infant J’s legal parents, that parentage did not give them a right to 
Louisiana’s primary method of parental identification—a birth certificate.24
The court reasoned that “birth certificates are merely ‘identity documents 
that evidence . . . the existing parent-child relationships, but do not create 
them.’”25 The court further stated that “no right created by the New York 
adoption order . . . has been frustrated, as nothing in the order entitles Ap-
pellees to a particular type of birth certificate.”26 Finally, the court conclud-
ed that “Louisiana has a right to issue birth certificates in the manner it 
deems fit,” which under current Louisiana law, does not include issuance to 
unmarried adoptive parents.27
On October 11, 2011, the United States Supreme Court denied the 
adoptive parents’ petition for writ of certiorari.28 This closed the door, at 
least for now, on Infant J’s chance of receiving an accurate birth certificate. 
The next part of this Comment will assess the implications of a policy that 
prevents Infant J from acquiring an updated birth certificate inscribed with 
both of his parents’ names. 
II. AN ADOPTIVE CHILD’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE — WHAT’S IN A PIECE 
OF PAPER?
The average person probably does not think much about her birth cer-
tificate. Other than the rare instance where a person may need a second 
form of identification, such as applying for a driver’s license,29 her birth 
certificate is likely tucked away in a drawer collecting dust. But for chil-
 22.  Id.
 23.  Id. at 159 (citing Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998): “The states’ duty 
to ‘recognize’ sister state judgments . . . does not compel states to ‘adopt the practices of other states 
regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.’”). 
 24.  Adar II, 639 F.3d at 159. 
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id.
 27.  Id. at 161. 
 28.  Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011). 
 29.  See, e.g., Applying for a New License (Drivers 18+) in Louisiana, DMV.ORG
http://www.dmv.org/la-louisiana/apply-license.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (“The [Office of Motor 
Vehicles] recommends your birth certificate as a primary form and your Social Security card and a 
payroll stub as secondary forms [of identification for applying for a driver’s license].”). 
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 182 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 182 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
11P - DAVOODI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2015 3:13 PM 
2015] SAME-SEX PARENTS AND ADOPTIONS 707 
dren of same-sex parents, not having an accurate birth certificate can cause 
unexpected complications.30 Some problems have already presented them-
selves to Mickey and Oren, such as issues with “[Mickey’s] ability to enroll 
his son on his company health plan,” “the couple’s ability to enroll their 
son [in] school,” and an incident where the couple was “stopped at an air-
port when airport personnel wanted proof of their relationship with the 
child.”31
A. Birth Certificates Generally 
Birth certificates are government-issued documents32 that are “univer-
sally recognized as reliable proof of a child’s identity and parentage.”33 The 
website for the Louisiana State Registrar & Vital Records describes birth 
records as being “essential for just administration of [Louisiana] law and 
for the protection of individual rights.”34 The birth certificates of adopted 
children in Louisiana and other states must include the adopted child’s 
name, date and place of birth, and the names of the adoptive parents.35
According to Professor Annette R. Appell of the Washington Univer-
sity Law School, “[b]y presenting the facts of birth, the birth certificate 
creates and protects rights and disabilities for adults and children. It is 
proof of a life and the rights that flow from that life.”36 She goes on to say 
that a birth certificate creates “legal truth because it is the official record of 
one’s identity. Attributes of this certificate of birth include belonging—
citizenship and family membership, with all of the attendant rights and 
privileges and limitations.”37 She states that, “[m]ost fundamentally, the 
birth certificate certifies and proves parenthood: the person or persons on 
the birth certificate are the child’s legal parents.”38 Further, Appell asserts 
 30.  See discussion below in Parts II.A and II.B. 
 31.  Adar v. Smith Case Background, LAMBDA LEGAL (Sept. 26, 2011),  
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/fs_adar-v-smith-case-
background_1.pdf. 
 32.  Camilla Taylor, Accurate Birth Certificates Make Families Less Vulnerable, LAMBDA LEGAL
(Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/oc_201012_accurate-birth-certificates.  
 33.  Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Courtney G. Joslin, Rhonda 
Wasserman, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3, Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-
30036), 2011 WL 3533772, at *3 (hereinafter Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011)). 
 34.  About Vital Records, STATE REGISTRAR & VITAL RECORDS,
http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/648/n/234 (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 35.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Joan Heifetz Hollinger et. al. in Support of Plaintiff’s-Appellees 
Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith and in Support of Affirmation at 6–7, Adar v. Smith, 591 F.Supp.2d 
857 (E.D. La. 2008) (No. 09-30036), 2010 WL 5778048 (hereinafter Brief of Amici Hollinger (2010)).  
 36.  Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 390 (2014).  
 37.  Id. at 391. 
 38.  Id. at 396.  
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that “[t]he birth certificate assigns, memorializes, and codifies the parent-
child relationship as the law constructs it. This creates a range of protec-
tions, freedoms, benefits, and obligations for the parents and the child.”39
Children with inaccurate birth certificates can face challenges in estab-
lishing their identity and parentage.40 Birth certificates are routinely re-
quired as identification for children in a variety of situations. For example, 
schools often need birth certificates for new student registration.41 Financial 
institutions may require a birth certificate to conduct a financial transaction 
for a minor child, such as setting up a bank account.42 Furthermore, in the 
event of a separation or divorce between the adoptive parents, a birth certif-
icate may help determine the future care, custody, and support of the 
child.43
A birth certificate can also be important for traveling. The U.S. State 
Department requires a birth certificate to issue a passport for children under 
fourteen.44 Some countries even require a parent traveling with a minor 
child to provide a birth certificate in addition to a passport.45
Additionally, birth certificates are often required to confirm the exist-
ence of a parent-child relationship in order for either party to receive vari-
ous kinds of financial benefits. For instance, the U.S. government may 
require a birth certificate to determine eligibility for surviving child Social 
Security benefits.46 Insurance companies may need a birth certificate to 
verify a child’s entitlement to a parent’s pension or other retirement bene-
fits, or their eligibility as a beneficiary of a parent’s estate.47 As Mickey 
and Oren experienced, a birth certificate may even be needed for a child to 
gain the benefit of a parent’s health insurance plan.48
The above list is not exhaustive, but it paints a picture of the kinds of 
struggles adoptive parents and children alike may suffer if an accurate birth 
certificate is not obtainable. While it is true that, in most situations, adop-
tive parents have the option of establishing parentage through other means, 
such as an adoption decree,49 the use of birth certificate alternatives can 
 39.  Id. at 395. 
 40.  Id. at 393, 394.  
 41.  Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011), supra note 33, at 12–13. 
 42.  Id.
 43.  See Adar v. Smith Case Background, supra note 31. 
 44.  Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011), supra note 33, at 12–13. 
 45.  Id.
 46.  Id.
 47.  Id. at 12–14. 
 48.  See Adar v. Smith Case Background, supra note 31. 
 49.  Adoptions are finalized through a court order or adoption decree, which “establishes the legal 
relationship between the child and his or her adoptive parent(s) and severs the legal relationship be-
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create additional problems.50 First, they may prevent a child from keeping 
his or her adoption private and confidential, forcing them to “repeatedly 
explain the circumstances of their adoption and the reasons why their birth 
certificates are incomplete.”51 It is not a stretch of the imagination to as-
sume that such explanations may have a negative impact on the affected 
child. Not having an accurate birth certificate may also make a child feel as 
if they are different from their peers since the vast majority of children and 
parents have birth certificates.52 Moreover, “alternatives are more likely to 
result in potentially harmful delays, bureaucratic complications and in-
creased costs.”53 Birth certificates are universally recognized, whereas 
adoption decrees may raise questions.54 Perhaps the most detrimental prob-
lem stemming from depending on birth certificate alternatives is that they 
may be unavailable or unreliable in emergency situations where time is of 
the essence, potentially causing physical harm to the child.55
B. In Case of Emergency 
A law or policy that keeps a child of same-sex parents from having an 
accurate birth certificate could have grave consequences for that child’s 
safety and well-being.56 Harm might come to such a child if it takes addi-
tional time in a critical situation to determine parentage, delaying treatment 
that could be lifesaving.57 Lambda Legal states that “[p]arents who don’t 
have accurate birth certificates for their children have extra reason to dread 
medical emergencies, fearing that doctors will delay a child’s emergency 
treatment while trying to figure out whether a parent has authority to con-
sent.”58 While such scenarios may seem farfetched, at least two cases 
reached the courts after same-sex adoptive parents experienced precisely 
this kind of heart-wrenching situation.59
tween the child and his or her biological parents. The decree also guarantees that the adoptive parent(s) 
‘will be treated as parents for all legal purposes.’” West, supra note 6, at 970–71. 
 50.  See Brief of Amici Hollinger (2011), supra note 33, at 14. 
 51.  Id. at 12. 
52.  See id. at 11. 
 53.  Id. at 14. 
 54.  Brief of Amici Hollinger (2010), supra note 35, at 10. 
 55.  See id.
 56.  See id. at 8–9. 
 57.  Id.
 58.  Taylor, supra note 32. 
 59.  See discussion in Parts B.1 and B.2. 
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1. Finstuen v. Crutcher—Only the Mother Can Ride in the            
Ambulance 
In Finstuen v. Crutcher, three same sex-couples and their adopted 
children challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the state from 
recognizing adoptions “by more than one individual of the same sex from 
any other state or foreign jurisdiction.”60 Lucy and Jennifer Doel were one 
of these couples.61 They adopted their Oklahoma-born child, “E,” in Cali-
fornia.62 Oklahoma issued them a supplemental birth certificate listing only 
Lucy as E’s parent, and denied their request to add Jennifer’s name to the 
certificate.63
The Doels had a scary experience when E needed to be transported to 
the emergency room via ambulance.64 The emergency medical technicians 
said only the “mother” could ride in the ambulance, so Jennifer was not 
allowed to ride with Lucy and E.65 Similarly, at first the emergency room 
personnel would only allow Lucy in the room with their sick child.66 Jen-
nifer was eventually allowed to be with E in her hospital room once the 
hospital personnel understood that both she and Lucy were E’s parents.67
The Tenth Circuit in Finstuen found the challenged Oklahoma adop-
tion statute unconstitutional, holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
required the Oklahoma State Department of Health to issue an updated 
birth certificate to the Doels containing both parents’ names.68 The court 
reasoned that, in recognizing the California adoption decree, Oklahoma 
was required to give the Doels the same rights to which all Oklahoma 
adoptive parents are entitled.69 Thus, “[i]f Oklahoma had no statute provid-
ing for the issuance of supplementary birth certificates for adopted chil-
dren, the Doels could not invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause in asking 
Oklahoma for a new birth certificate.”70 However, because Oklahoma did
have such a statute in place, the state was required to issue the Doels an 
 60.  Finstuen v. Crutcher (Finstuen II), 496 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 61.  Id.
 62.  Id.
 63.  Id.
 64.  Finstuen v. Edmondson (Finstuen I), 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Ok. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom., Finstuen II, 496 F.3d at 1139. 
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id.
 67.  Id.
 68.  Finstuen II, 496 F.3d at 1156. 
 69.  Id. at 1154. 
 70.  Id.
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updated birth certificate just as they would do for any other adopting cou-
ple residing in Oklahoma71
The Fifth Circuit in Adar, recognizing that Finstuen was a similar 
case, attempted to distinguish it. The Fifth Circuit insisted that Finstuen
and Adar are different because Finstuen dealt with a challenge to a statute 
and Adar involved a challenge to the actions of an executive official.72
However, most believe that the Adar decision created a circuit split, includ-
ing the Adar dissenters.73 The dissent in Adar stated that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause requires states to accord the judgments of sister states full 
faith and credit, regardless of which branch of state government is in-
volved.74
The alleged circuit split was created when the Fifth Circuit decided in 
Adar that amending a birth certificate is considered an enforcement of a 
sister state’s final judgment of adoption; doing so was only required if Lou-
isiana would have issued the adoption under its own laws.75 Like Louisi-
ana, Oklahoma does not permit joint adoption by unmarried persons.76 But 
the Tenth Circuit found that amending a birth certificate according to Okla-
homa’s law is recognition of another state’s judgment as required by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.77 Under the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning, when 
the Fifth Circuit in Adar claimed to honor the parentage of Oren and Mick-
ey, but only put one parent’s name on the birth certificate, the Adar court 
awarded only “half faith and credit” to their valid adoption decree.78
2. Gartner v. Iowa Department of Public Health—An Exhausting 
Vigil
Similarly, in Gartner v. Iowa Department of Public Health, Heather 
Martin Gartner and Melissa Gartner challenged the state of Iowa’s refusal 
 71.  Id.
 72.  Adar v. Smith (Adar II), 639 F.3d 146, 182 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 73.  See, e.g., Drew Lambert, What Happens in Vegas New York, Stays in Vegas New York: A 
Criticism of Adar v. Smith, 9 MOD. AM. 59 (2013); Joseph A. Fraioli, Note, Having Faith in Full Faith 
& Credit: Finstuen, Adar, and the Quest for Interstate Same-Sex Parental Recognition, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 365 (2012); Lauren Lombardo, Note, Does Heather Have Two Mommies?: The Importance of 
Full Faith and Credit Recognition for Adoptions By Same-Sex Couples, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1301 
(2012). 
 74.  Adar II, 639 F.3d at 182 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 75.  Id. at 160–61. 
 76.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7503.1-1 (West 2013). 
 77.  Finstuen v. Crutcher (Finstuen II), 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 78.  Adar II, 639 F.3d at 180 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
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to issue an accurate birth certificate to their daughter, MacKenzie, which 
listed both women as parents.79
Heather is MacKenzie’s biological mother, having conceived her 
through anonymous donor insemination.80 The day after MacKenzie was 
born, Heather and Melissa completed a hospital form for MacKenzie’s 
birth certificate, but when they received the birth certificate it had only 
Heather’s name.81 Heather and Melissa asked the Iowa Department of Pub-
lic Health (the Department) to reissue the birth certificate with both of their 
names, but the Department denied their request.82 The Department rea-
soned: “The system for registration of births in Iowa currently recognizes 
the biological and ‘gendered’ roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father,’ grounded in 
the biological fact that a child has one biological mother and one biological 
father . . . .”83
Lambda Legal describes Heather and Melissa’s experience in 2010 
when MacKenzie became seriously ill and was hospitalized in an intensive 
care unit:
Heather maintained an exhausting vigil at Mackenzie’s bedside day and 
night because Heather and Melissa both feared that, without an accurate 
birth certificate, the hospital would not recognize Melissa as a parent and 
permit her to make decisions or even remain with Mackenzie if an emer-
gency occurred in Heather’s absence. Later, when Mackenzie needed a 
surgical procedure, Heather had to take time off from work to be present 
during the procedure and Mackenzie’s complete recovery even though 
Melissa, as the stay-at-home parent, was available to care for Mackenzie 
and the couple would have preferred to avoid having Heather miss as 
much work. These stresses and frustrations compounded the anxiety the 
family already felt over their infant’s terrifying illness.84
The Iowa Supreme Court in Gartner found that, under Iowa’s equal 
protection clause, the statute allowing only “the name of the husband” to 
appear on the birth certificate was unconstitutional when applied to a mar-
ried lesbian couple who had a child born to them during their marriage.85
In the emergency situations the Doels and Gartners faced, what if the 
legally recognized parent had not been present? The parent whose name 
 79.  Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 341–42 (Iowa 2013).  
 80.  Id. at 341. 
 81.  Id.
 82.  Id. at 341–42. 
 83.  Id. at 342. 
 84.  Taylor, supra note 32. 
 85.  Gartner, 830 N.W.2d at 354. However, it is important to note that in making their decision in 
Gartner, the Iowa Supreme Court considered the special protections they had previously afforded to 
homosexuals in Iowa. Specifically, the court in Varnum v. Brien held that classifications based on 
sexual orientation must be analyzed under a heightened level of scrutiny and determined that same-sex 
couples could not be excluded from civil marriages in Iowa. 763 N.W.2d 862, 896, 907 (Iowa 2009).  
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was not listed on the birth certificate may have been unable to exercise her 
parental right to make medical decisions on behalf of her minor child. This 
frightening reality is one no parent should ever have to face, and yet Mick-
ey and Oren are doing just that each day Infant J goes without an accurate 
birth certificate. 
III. DENYING RECOGNIZED PARENTS ACCURATE BIRTH
CERTIFICATES FOR THEIR ADOPTIVE CHILDREN RESULTS IN A VIOLATION 
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
Many papers have focused on the circuit split created by the Adar
court regarding its interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as that 
clause relates to adoption judgments. But few have examined the ways in 
which Mickey and Oren were denied equal protection when they could not 
obtain an accurate birth certificate for Infant J. The Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State . . . shall deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”86 Equal 
protection issues can arise either when a law discriminates against or dis-
advantages a class of individuals, or when a law interferes with the exercise 
of a fundamental right.87 Legal challenges based on equal protection re-
quire the government to identify a sufficiently important objective for its 
discriminatory law.88 What is sufficient depends on the type of discrimina-
tion involved.89
When analyzing equal protection claims, courts traditionally apply one 
of three levels of review.90 The level of review applied depends on the type 
of classification used, though in the case of fundamental rights courts typi-
cally use the least deferential level of review.91 The lowest level of review, 
and the most deferential to the legislature, is the rational basis test.92 Under 
the rational basis test, the challenged law will be upheld as long as it is 
rationally related to any legitimate government interest.93 With such a low 
 86.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 87.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 685, 812 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 88.  Id. at 685. 
 89.  Id.
 90.  Id. at 687–88. 
 91.  Id. at 687, 812. 
 92.  Id. at 688. 
 93.  Id.
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bar, laws are rarely declared unconstitutional for failure to show a rational 
basis.94
In certain situations, courts will apply one of the two more exacting 
levels of scrutiny. The middle level of review is intermediate scrutiny.95
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law will be upheld only if it is substantially 
related to an important government interest.96 Courts have applied this level 
of review in cases dealing with discrimination based on classifications of 
gender and discrimination against nonmarital children (previously referred 
to as illegitimacy).97
The highest and least deferential level of review is strict scrutiny.98 To 
survive strict scrutiny, a law must be necessary to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest, and it must be narrowly tailored to achieve its in-
tended result.99 One of the most difficult challenges for the government is 
that it must show it could not achieve its objective through less restrictive 
alternatives.100 Courts apply strict scrutiny when there is discrimination 
based on race or national origin, or when the government burdens a funda-
mental right, such as the right to access the courts.101 When a fundamental 
right is at issue, the question involves whether the government has a suffi-
cient purpose for discrimination as to who can exercise the right.102
A. The Adar Majority and Dissent Disagree Over How to Analyze the 
Equal Protection Clause Claim 
Although most of the Adar court’s opinion focuses on the adoptive 
parents’ full faith and credit claim, the court also ruled on their equal pro-
tection claim.103 The court’s characterization of the adoptive parents’ ar-
gument was that “Louisiana treats a subset of children—adoptive children 
of unmarried parents—differently from adopted children with married 
 94.  Id.
 95.  Id. at 687. 
 96.  Id.
 97.  Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87. 
 98.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 687. 
 99.  Id.
 100.  Id.
 101.  Id. at 687, 812. 
 102.  Id. at 813. 
 103.  Adar v. Smith (Adar II), 639 F.3d 146, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2011). Note, however, that the 
dissent thought they should not have ruled on the equal protection claim considering the district court 
never addressed it. The dissent wrote, “The only time we should ever reach an issue that was not first 
decided in the district court is when such issue presents a pure question of law the ‘proper resolution [of 
which] . . . is beyond any doubt.’ [] I respectfully disagree with the en banc majority’s conclusion that 
the proper resolution of Appellees’ Equal Protection Clause claim is purely legal and its resolution is 
beyond doubt.” Id. at 183 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 186 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 186 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
11P - DAVOODI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2015 3:13 PM 
2015] SAME-SEX PARENTS AND ADOPTIONS 715 
parents, and this differential treatment does not serve any legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.”104 The court did not adopt a form of heightened scruti-
ny and instead analyzed the claim under traditional rational basis review.105
The court concluded that the Louisiana law did not run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause because Louisiana has a “legitimate interest in encourag-
ing a stable and nurturing environment for the education and socialization 
of its adopted children,” and “Louisiana may rationally conclude that hav-
ing parenthood focused on a married couple or single individu-
al . . . furthers the interests of adopted children.”106
The dissent in Adar strongly disagreed with the en banc majority’s 
analysis of the equal protection claim.107 The dissent noted that the adop-
tive parents were not challenging Louisiana’s adoption laws or policies, but 
were challenging the Registrar’s policy of denying them an accurate birth 
certificate.108 Because of this, the dissent argued, “the governmental inter-
est served by [the Registrar’s] refusal to issue a birth certificate reflecting 
both unmarried out-of-state adoptive parents must extend beyond a defense 
of Louisiana’s adoption laws.”109 The dissent further opined that because 
the Registrar did not deny the birth certificate until well after Infant J was 
adopted by Mickey and Oren, the Registrar’s action could not be rationally 
related to the potential stability of Infant J’s home.110
The dissent also took issue with the majority’s Equal Protection 
Clause comparator.111 The majority deemed married non-biological parents 
to be the relevant comparator class to unmarried non-biological parents 
such as Mickey and Oren.112 The dissent argued that the correct comparator 
should be unmarried biological parents.113 The dissent pointed out that, 
“[b]y statute, Louisiana recognizes and issues birth certificates to unmar-
ried biological parents, irrespective of its proffered policy preference that 
children only have parents who are married to one another.”114 Further, the 
dissent noted that “nothing in this provision conditions issuance of such 
birth certificates on the biological parents’ maintaining a common 
 104.  Id. at 161. 
 105.  Id. at 161–62. 
 106.  Id. at 162.  
 107.  Id. at 183–86 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 108.  Id. at 184. 
 109.  Id. (emphasis removed). 
 110.  Id.
 111.  Id. at 184–85. 
 112.  Id.
 113.  Id. at 185 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 114.  Id.
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home.”115 Under Louisiana law, an unmarried couple is statutorily entitled 
to a birth certificate for their biological child that includes both parents’ 
names, regardless of whether they live together.116 The only prerequisite is 
that they verify the information on the birth certificate, which is parallel to 
Louisiana’s prerequisite of a certified copy of an out-of-state adoption de-
cree for obtaining a corrected Louisiana birth certificate.117 The dissent’s 
contention was that Louisiana does not have a legitimate governmental 
interest for treating unmarried, non-biological adoptive parents and unmar-
ried, biological parents differently for the purpose of issuing birth certifi-
cates with two parents listed.118
B. Mickey and Oren’s Equal Protection Claim can be Analyzed Based 
on Denial of a Fundamental Right or as Discrimination Based on         
Classification
To date, the Supreme Court has not held that gays and lesbians are a 
suspect class triggering strict scrutiny, but that does not mean Mickey and 
Oren’s equal protection claim automatically fails. This section presents two 
other ways a court could analyze the adoptive parents’ equal protection 
claim. 
First, the Court has found in the past that state interference with family 
autonomy can infringe on a fundamental right, thus requiring some kind of 
heightened scrutiny.119 The rigid nature of the scrutiny question works well 
in some legal contexts, but it has been followed less stringently in the fami-
ly law context.120 Certainly, recent constitutional doctrine regarding same-
sex couples reinforces the idea that the levels of scrutiny are less rigid 
when applied to family law.121 Because not having an accurate birth certifi-
cate may affect family decision-making and infringe on the parent/child 
relationship, the Registrar’s policy might fit into this category of case law. 
Second, while the majority in Adar used traditional rational basis re-
view, a very deferential legal standard, the dissent seemed to be hinting at 
something less deferential, even while using the language of rational ba-
 115.  Id.
 116.  Id.
 117.  Id.
 118.  Id. at 185–86. 
 119.  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 120.  See, e.g., Zablocki, 435 U.S. at 388–89 (stating that “We may accept for present purposes that 
these are legitimate and substantial interests, but, since the means selected by the State for achieving 
these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained.”). 
 121.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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sis.122 The Supreme Court has used this same approach before to strike 
down laws discriminating against gays and lesbians where the Court felt it 
was inappropriate to formally use a heightened level of scrutiny.123 Even 
though the Registrar’s policy is not discriminatory on its face, if it nonethe-
less effectively discriminates against gays and lesbians, it is likely uncon-
stitutional.
Viewing Adar through either or both of these equal protection lenses 
leads to the conclusion that denying Mickey and Oren an accurate birth 
certificate for Infant J was a violation of their constitutional rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
1. Too Much State Interference with the Fundamental Rights That 
Flow From the Parent-Child Relationship Requires a More Rigorous    
Scrutiny
Louisiana’s policy of refusing to provide accurate birth certificates to 
out-of-state parents who already have parental status denies those parents 
equal protection. Because anyone in Louisiana who has parental status can 
obtain an accurate birth certificate, the only people to whom this policy 
applies are out-of-state adoptive parents and their children.124 The Fifth 
Circuit argued that denying Mickey and Oren a birth certificate with both 
their names did not affect their parental status.125 But in everyday practice, 
birth certificates create a presumption of parent-child relationships.126 This 
is particularly true for adoptive parents who have no biological link to their 
children and thus are keenly aware of how important the legal designation 
of parenthood is.127 When Louisiana chooses not to issue accurate birth 
certificates to these out-of-state parents, Louisiana revisits valid parentage 
determinations and undermines them. 
 122.  Adar II, 639 F.3d at 183–84 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 123.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 620. 
 124.  Under Louisiana law, unmarried couples living in Louisiana cannot jointly adopt a child, 
which means they cannot obtain legal parental status. It thus follows that Louisiana’s policy of not 
issuing birth certificates to unmarried parents with parental status can only apply to out-of-state parents.  
 125.  Adar II, 639 F.3d at 159. 
 126.  See Appell, supra note 36, at 390 (“[T]he birth certificate certifies and proves parenthood: the 
person or persons on the birth certificate are the child’s legal parents.”). 
 127.   
An adoption proceeding ends an initial legally-recognized (and enforceable) parent-child rela-
tionship and replaces it with an entirely new legal parent-child relationship. In the law, with 
the exception of step-child adoptions, the new parent-child relationship attaches to the adop-
tive parents and child as if the child were born of the adoptive parents. The former relation-
ship (in most jurisdictions) is treated as if it had never existed. 
Adoption Act (1994) Summary, supra note 6. 
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The Equal Protection Clause is usually invoked when a law interferes 
with a fundamental right,128 and many rights associated with the family are 
characterized as fundamental. In 1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Ne-
braska defined liberty in broad terms to include the rights “to marry” and 
“to establish a home and bring up children.”129 In Meyer, the Court found 
that a statute that forbade teaching any language except English in schools 
interfered “with the power of parents to control the education of their own 
[children].”130 Two years later, the Court similarly invalidated a state law 
that required children to attend public schools.131
In 1944, the Court heard Prince v. Massachusetts. In Prince, a child 
who was a Jehovah’s Witness distributed religious literature alongside her 
aunt and legal custodian, contrary to the Massachusetts child labor laws.132
The Court stated, “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der.”133 Fast-forward to Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972, where the Court con-
sidered whether Amish parents were required to send their children to 
school past the 8th grade in keeping with compulsory attendance laws.134
Although the case was primarily about free exercise of religion, Yoder did 
discuss parental rights, expressing that it is “the fundamental interest of 
parents . . . to guide the religious future and education of their children.”135
More recently, in Troxel v. Granville, a plurality of the Court dis-
cussed the long recognized “fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”136 Specifically, 
the Troxel Court held that a state cannot “infringe on the fundamental right 
of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because [someone acting 
on behalf of the] state [] believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”137
Even with the many examples available, the precise scope of funda-
mental rights dealing with family autonomy is not clear. It is unlikely that 
there is a fundamental right to an accurate birth certificate. However, the 
interference with the parent-child relationship caused by denying an accu-
 128.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 812–13. 
 129.  262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 130.  Id. at 400–01. 
 131.  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 132.  321 U.S. 158, 161–63 (1944). 
 133.  Id. at 166. 
 134.  406 U.S. 205, 208–13 (1972). 
 135.  Id. at 232. 
 136.  530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
 137.  Id. at 72–73. 
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rate birth certificate to recognized parents seems to fit within the familial 
rights that courts have already afforded some level of constitutional protec-
tion. Specifically, Louisiana’s policy may burden fundamental rights asso-
ciated with both parents and children. 
a. The Constitutional Rights of the Adoptive Parents 
Louisiana’s policy is an unconstitutional restriction on the rights of 
out-of-state recognized parents. As discussed earlier in this Comment, not 
having access to an accurate birth certificate in emergency medical situa-
tions can lead to scenarios where a parent is unable to exercise her right to 
make medical decisions on behalf of her child.138 In some instances, the 
parent may not even be allowed to be present with her child in an ambu-
lance or hospital room.139 These practices evidence a clear denial of quin-
tessential parental decision-making “concerning the care, custody and 
control” of one’s child.140
More generally, adoptive parents who do not have accurate birth cer-
tificates for their children may feel as if they need to live their lives differ-
ently.141 They may worry about traveling across state lines or 
internationally, constantly calculating the risks of being in a situation where 
having a birth certificate with both parents’ names might make a differ-
ence, even while taking the extra step to always have their adoption judg-
ment on hand. By effectively requiring out-of-state recognized parents to 
go through this more onerous process to ensure that their decision-making 
regarding their child is honored, Louisiana’s policy interferes with family 
autonomy. 
Further, a parallel can be drawn between birth certificates and mar-
riage licenses. When laws have interfered with a person’s ability to obtain a 
marriage license, courts have routinely found a fundamental right trigger-
ing heightened scrutiny.142 For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, a Wiscon-
sin statute made it illegal for residents with support obligations to 
noncustodial children to obtain a marriage license unless they could show, 
among other things, that they were complying with those obligations.143
The Supreme Court found that the state could not interfere with the plain-
tiff’s ability to obtain a marriage license just because he was in arrears on 
 138.  See Brief of Amici Hollinger (2010), supra note 35, at 8. 
 139.  See, e.g., Finstuen v. Edmondson (Finstuen I), 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Ok. 2006). 
 140.  See id.
 141.  See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 32. 
 142.  See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 143.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375. 
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his child support.144 The Court held the ability to obtain a marriage license 
in the same esteem as other fundamental rights, including “decisions relat-
ing to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.”145
Because the law interfered with a fundamental right, the Court invoked 
heightened scrutiny and decided that the statute was neither supported by 
sufficiently important state interests, nor closely tailored to effectuate those 
interests.146
The Court has also been willing to protect the right to obtain a mar-
riage license for prison inmates. In Turner v. Safley, prisoners at the Renz 
Correctional Institution in Missouri filed suit over a regulation that permit-
ted an inmate to get a marriage license only with permission of the prison 
superintendent.147 Permission would only be granted if there were compel-
ling reasons to do so (e.g., a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate 
child).148 Following Zablocki, the Court again found that denial of a mar-
riage license warranted heightened scrutiny.149 The Court looked to see if 
the prison’s marriage regulation was reasonably related to penological in-
terests and found that it was not.150
It is true that Zablocki and Turner are not perfect analogies for the 
case at hand. The plaintiffs petitioning for marriage licenses in Zablocki
and Turner did not have marital status without a license whereas Mickey 
and Oren do have parental status without an accurate birth certificate. 
However, it is the pieces of paper themselves that are the key. Marriage 
licenses and birth certificates function in an analogous way. The state deci-
sion to issue a marriage license cements the spousal relationship. Similarly, 
the state decision to issue a birth certificate with the names of a child’s 
parents cements the parent-child relationship, perhaps especially for adop-
tive parents, who depend on the state to create and legalize their parentage 
in the first place.151
While states do need some freedom to restrict whose name can be on a 
birth certificate—for example, requiring proof of a genetic connection be-
fore including a name on a birth certificate152—it does not make sense for a 
 144.  Id. at 386. 
 145.  Id.
 146.  Id. at 388. 
 147.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82. 
 148.  Id.
 149.  Id. at 95. 
 150.  Id. at 99. 
 151.  See Adoption Act (1994) Summary, supra note 6. 
 152.  See, e.g., U.S. LEGAL FORMS, LOUISIANA PATERNITY FORMS, DOCUMENTS AND LAW,
http://www.uslegalforms.com/paternity/louisiana-paternity-forms.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) 
(“With science giving us more accurate testing, the matter of establishing paternity is easier and more 
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state to deny birth certificates to already recognized parents. States certain-
ly have a legitimate interest in requiring some degree of proof of whose 
name should be included on a birth certificate. But once proof of parentage 
has been procured, states no longer have an interest in preventing a parent 
from putting his or her name on the certificate. Louisiana’s policy infringes 
on the rights of out-of-state adoptive parents and should be subject to a 
more rigorous scrutiny for interfering with family autonomy. 
Under heightened scrutiny, Louisiana’s policy should be struck down. 
Denying out-of-state recognized adoptive parents access to accurate birth 
certificates for their children is not substantially related to Louisiana’s pur-
ported government interest of family stability. As discussed, Louisiana’s 
policy forces out-of-state parents to jump through additional hoops before 
making important decisions on behalf of their children. This has the ironic 
effect of undermining family stability instead of preserving it. 
b. The Constitutional Rights of the Adoptive Children 
Louisiana’s policy is also an unconstitutional infringement on the 
rights of the adoptive children of out-of-state unmarried parents. Cases 
dealing with discrimination against nonmarital—”illegitimate”—children 
provide a useful comparison. It is important to note that the illegitimacy 
cases look at nonmarital children as a suspect class while this analysis is 
focusing on fundamental rights.153 Despite that difference, there are im-
portant principles to derive from the illegitimacy cases. 
In Clark v. Jeter, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law 
that required that actions to establish paternity of a nonmarital child must 
be commenced within six years of birth.154 The Court established that in-
termediate scrutiny is appropriate for cases dealing with discrimination of 
this type.155 Their justification for scrutiny of that level was that it is unfair 
to penalize children for their parents’ actions outside of marriage.156 In 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, the Court stated: 
The statute of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s con-
demnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But 
reliable than in the past. DNA testing methods include SWAB Test and DNA Genetic Identity. . . . The 
Father will be shown on the birth certificate if he acknowledges paternity when or close in time to the 
birth, or the Court orders the birth certificate to be changed to reflect the Fathers name.”). 
 153.  As discussed earlier, there are two ways to trigger heightened scrutiny in an equal protection 
claim—either by arguing a fundamental right has been infringed upon, or where an equal protection 
question involves a suspect class. Here I am arguing that a fundamental right is at issue, not that Mickey 
and Oren are members of a suspect class. See supra Part III. 
 154.  486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
 155.  Id. at 461. 
 156.  Id.
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visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and un-
just. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary 
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is 
an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.157
The same line of reasoning is applicable when Louisiana uses its poli-
cy of refusing to issue accurate birth certificates to recognized out-of-state 
parents as a disincentive to adopt and raise children outside of marriage. 
First, as discussed above, Louisiana has a legitimate interest in regulating 
who is a parent in Louisiana, but Louisiana does not have a legitimate in-
terest in undermining the parentage of an out-of-state couple. Second, Lou-
isiana’s policy could cause real harm to adopted children, effectively 
“penalizing” them for their parents’ choice to adopt them without getting 
married first. 
At the most basic level, not having an accurate birth certificate may 
cause adopted children to feel even more different than they already may 
feel as a result of being adopted. If a child’s parents must use birth certifi-
cate alternatives, such as an adoption decree, to register the child for 
school, for instance, that draws attention to the child’s adoption instead of 
keeping it confidential. Then there is the physical harm that may come to a 
child in an emergency, or the confusion and fear a child may feel if one of 
her parents is not allowed to accompany her in a scary ambulance ride or 
hospital room. The illegitimacy cases suggest that if Louisiana’s policy 
leads to these kinds of consequences it should be subject to intermediate 
scrutiny. 
Applying intermediate scrutiny, a policy that denies unmarried adop-
tive parents access to accurate birth certificates for their adoptive children 
is not substantially related to the important government interest of family 
stability for adopted children and their parents, contrary to Louisiana’s 
claim. In the first place, as the illegitimacy cases indicate, courts are partic-
ularly concerned about policies that harm children for the sake of regulat-
ing the sexual behavior of their parents. Further, even if Louisiana’s 
purported interest in family stability is important, denying birth certificates 
to out-of-state unmarried adoptive parents is not substantially related to 
such an interest because Louisiana is not capable of keeping anyone, except 
for Louisiana citizens, from becoming parents. Specifically, Mickey and 
Oren had already adopted Infant J at the time they applied for the corrected 
 157.  406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
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birth certificate, so Louisiana’s policy had no bearing on the supposed sta-
bility of Infant J’s family. 
Setting aside Louisiana’s purported purpose, the only purpose left 
standing is to send a message to unmarried adoptive parents that they are 
unequal to married adoptive parents. If denial of an accurate birth certifi-
cate is important enough to rise to the level of constitutional protection, 
then a purpose to treat unmarried adoptive parents differently from married 
ones is not substantially related to the state interest of family stability, and 
the policy is unconstitutional. 
2. Beneath the Surface, Louisiana’s Policy Boils Down to Animus 
against Gays and Lesbians 
Even if a court declines to analyze the ability to obtain an accurate 
birth certificate under a theory of fundamental rights, case law suggests that 
laws that treat gays and lesbians as second-class citizens are subject to a 
higher level of scrutiny than rational basis review.158 For the sake of argu-
ment, assume that Louisiana may have a legitimate interest in not allowing 
same-sex couples that live in Louisiana to adopt. Historically, states have 
the power to regulate who gets to be a parent and how they can become 
one.159 However, it is something entirely different to say that Louisiana has 
a legitimate interest in refusing to provide birth certificates to recognized 
same-sex parents from other states. 
There have been times in the Supreme Court’s history where the Court 
chose not to formally apply heightened scrutiny, but its equal protection 
analysis did not conform to the traditional, low-level rational basis scrutiny. 
This kind of analysis can be described as rational basis plus—though the 
Court uses the language of rational basis, the review has more bite to it.160
Notably, the Court has applied versions of rational basis plus reasoning in 
two different cases dealing with discrimination against gays and lesbians—
Romer v. Evans and United States v. Windsor.161
Romer challenged an amendment to the Colorado constitution that 
prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial action . . . designed to pro-
tect . . . homosexual persons.”162 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
 158.  See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
 159.  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“[D]omestic relations [is] an area [of law] that has 
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”). 
 160.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 696. 
 161.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675; Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.  
 162.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24. 
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described the amendment as a sweeping change in legal status for gays and 
lesbians, stripping only them of “specific legal protection from the injuries 
caused by discrimination.”163
The Court said it would only uphold the amendment if it bore a ration-
al relation to some legitimate end, and then admonished that the amend-
ment “fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”164 The main 
rationale Colorado offered for the amendment was “respect for citizens’ 
freedom of association, [particularly] the liberties of landlords or employ-
ers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”165 Regular 
rational basis review is so deferential to state objectives that under it, such 
a rationale would almost certainly have been acceptable.166 But the Court 
refused to credit Colorado’s rationale as legitimate and held that the 
amendment “classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end 
but to make them unequal to everyone else.”167
The recent case United States v. Windsor seemed to apply a similar 
heightened rational basis review, at least in part. In 2007, Edith Windsor 
and Thea Spyer, residents of New York, traveled to Toronto to marry.168
The couple’s home state of New York recognized their same-sex mar-
riage.169 In 2009, Thea passed away, leaving her entire estate to Edith.170
However, because Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) de-
fined marriage as being between a man and a woman only, Edith was re-
quired by law to pay taxes on the estate that she would have been exempt 
from if she were in a heterosexual marriage.171 In 2010, Edith filed suit in 
federal district court, seeking a declaration that Section 3 of DOMA was 
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.172
The district court found for Edith and the Second Circuit affirmed.173
The Supreme Court, in an opinion also authored by Justice Kennedy, up-
held the Second Circuit’s decision, but laid out different reasoning.174 The 
 163.  Id. at 627. 
 164.  Id. at 631–32. 
 165.  Id. at 635. 
 166.  Id. at 640–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is unsurprising that the Court avoids discussion of 
[whether there was a legitimate rational basis for the substance of the constitutional amendment], since 
the answer is so obviously yes.”). 
 167.  Id. at 635. 
 168.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
 169.  Id.
 170.  Id.
 171.  Id.
 172.  Id.
 173.  Id. at 2684. 
 174.  Id. at 2693–96. The Second Circuit laid out its analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, 
finding that gays and lesbians are a quasi-suspect class deserving of heightened scrutiny. Using inter-
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Court used a combination of federalism, liberty, and equal protection ar-
guments in holding that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.175
Much like in Romer, the Court’s equal protection arguments applied a 
less deferential form of rational basis to invalidate DOMA.176 Justice Ken-
nedy wrote: 
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom 
same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their mar-
riage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is 
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to 
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.177
Unlike the statute in Romer, DOMA was not discriminatory on its face, as 
it sought to traditionally define marriage without mentioning gays and les-
bians at all.178 Yet the majority seemed to believe DOMA’s discriminatory 
purpose and effects were so egregious that they required a more rigorous 
scrutiny than traditional rational basis review.179
Romer and Windsor suggest that gays and lesbians, as a class, are de-
serving of some kind of special protection, even though that protection has 
not yet risen to the level of officially labeling gays and lesbians as a suspect 
class. The question, then, is whether Louisiana’s birth certificate policy is 
making an inappropriate distinction between gays and lesbians and every-
one else. Louisiana’s denial of accurate birth certificates does not apply to 
any Louisiana couples that have established parentage. The policy only 
denies birth certificates to out-of-state couples who have already adopted a 
child and been granted parentage by a different state. Refusing to issue 
birth certificates to recognized parents creates “second-class” parental sta-
tus for these individuals and “humiliates tens of thousands of children now 
being raised by same-sex couples,” which the Windsor majority already 
found to be impermissible.180
On its face, Louisiana’s policy appears to have nothing to do with dis-
crimination against gays and lesbians and everything to do with ensuring 
only married individuals can jointly adopt children. Louisiana focuses on 
mediate scrutiny, the court held that DOMA was not substantially related to an important governmental 
interest, and thus was unconstitutional. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 175.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96. 
 176.  See id. at 2706–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven setting aside traditional moral disapproval 
of same-sex marriage (or indeed same-sex sex), there are many perfectly valid . . . justifying rationales 
for this legislation. Their existence ought to be the end of this case.”). 
 177.  Id. at 2696. 
 178.  See 1 U.S.C.A § 7 (1996). 
 179.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 180.  Id. at 2693–94. 
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the fact that the Registrar’s policy equally affects unmarried heterosexual 
couples. In doing so, however, Louisiana ignores the reality that heterosex-
ual individuals have the opportunity to marry under Louisiana law (and 
indeed, under the laws of every state), thus giving heterosexual couples the 
option to circumvent the policy.181 Same-sex couples, on the other hand, 
are not permitted to marry under Louisiana law.182 Because out-of-state 
adoptive parents who are heterosexual and married have their adoptions 
recognized, gays and lesbians are left feeling that the Louisiana law is pun-
ishing them as parents. 
A belief in family stability and the superiority of bi-gender parenting 
may be an acceptable rationale for Louisiana’s government in creating 
policies that solely govern citizens of Louisiana. But Mickey and Oren do 
not live in Louisiana, and the birth certificate policy is only ever applied to 
out-of-state parents. Denying such parents accurate birth certificates is a 
completely ineffective way to ensure that children are raised in heterosexu-
al households or to keep gays and lesbians from becoming parents. Louisi-
ana generally cites family stability as a legitimate state interest for its 
policy, but by the time couples like Mickey and Oren contact Louisiana’s 
Registrar for birth certificates, they have already been legally deemed the 
parents of their adoptive child. Family stability cannot possibly be rational-
ly related to this policy when Louisiana is incapable of keeping any other 
state’s citizens from becoming parents. Additionally, Louisiana certainly 
cannot argue that there is a legitimate state interest in undermining the 
strength of out-of-state parent-child relationships (the only thing this policy 
seems to actually accomplish). 
Stripped of its façade, the Registrar’s policy boils down to nothing but 
animus against gays and lesbians, the only class of parents who are denied 
a birth certificate under its policy. It is well established that “a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”183 Under a more biting rational basis 
review, such as the type of scrutiny employed by the Supreme Court in 
both Romer and Windsor, the Registrar’s policy unconstitutionally discrim-
inates against gay and lesbian parents in general and specifically denies 
Mickey and Oren equal protection of the laws. 
 181.  Out-of-state unmarried straight couples can choose to get married and have those marriages 
recognized under Louisiana law. Out-of-state unmarried same-sex couples lack this option. See LA.
CONST. art. XII, § 15.  
 182.  Id. (“Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one man and one 
woman.”). 
 183.  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
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CONCLUSION
Birth certificates are more than mere pieces of paper to the adopted 
children of same-sex couples. In deciding Adar, the Fifth Circuit should 
have kept in mind the unique importance that an accurate birth certificate 
can have for adopted children and their parents. The fundamental rights 
that stem from the parent-child relationship and the established need to 
protect gays and lesbians from laws aimed to deny them dignity suggest 
that laws that infringe on the parental rights of gays and lesbians should be 
subject to some form of heightened scrutiny. 
Even if neither equal protection argument made in this Comment is 
persuasive standing alone, the two arguments taken collectively indicate 
that something is just not right with Louisiana’s birth certificate policy. 
There is precedent for this kind of global approach in Windsor. Justice 
Kennedy used the language of equal protection, due process, and federal-
ism in describing why Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.184 While 
Justice Kennedy seemed hesitant to anchor his holding in any one of the 
three doctrines alone, he made clear that something was amiss with 
DOMA.
 “Under DOMA,” he wrote for the majority, “same-sex married cou-
ples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible 
and public ways. By its great reach, DOMA touches many aspects of mar-
ried and family life, from the mundane to the profound.”185 Viewing Loui-
siana’s policy through a wider, more comprehensive lens leads to the same 
conclusion—denying accurate birth certificates to recognized out-of-state 
adoptive parents impermissibly burdens the families involved, affecting 
them in a variety of ways, and is of no legitimate interest to the state. 
 184.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675. 
 185.  Id. at 2694. 
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